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This study introduces automation into a Schumpeterian growth model to explore
the e¤ects of R&D and automation subsidies. R&D subsidy increases innovation and
growth but decreases the share of automated industries and the degree of capital in-
tensity in the aggregate production function. Automation subsidy has the opposite
e¤ects on these macroeconomic variables. Calibrating the model to US data, we nd
that raising R&D subsidy increases the welfare of high-skill workers but decreases the
welfare of low-skill workers and capital owners, whereas increasing automation subsidy
increases the welfare of high-skill workers and capital owners but decreases the welfare
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automation depends on how it evaluates the welfare gains and losses of di¤erent agents
in the economy.
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1 Introduction
Automation allows machines to perform tasks that are previously performed by workers. On
the one hand, automation may be a threat to the employment of workers. For example, a
recent study by Frey and Osborne (2017) examines 702 occupations and nds that almost half
of them could be automated within the next two decades. On the other hand, automation
reduces the cost of production and frees up resources for more productive activities. Given
the rising importance of automation,1 we develop a growth model with automation to explore
its e¤ects on the macroeconomy.
Specically, we introduce automation in the form of capital-labor substitution into a
Schumpeterian growth model. Then, we apply the model to explore the e¤ects of R&D
subsidy versus automation subsidy on innovation, economic growth and the welfare of di¤er-
ent agents in the economy. In our model, an industry uses labor as the factor input before
automation occurs. When the industry becomes automated, it then uses capital as the fac-
tor input. Innovation in the form of a quality improvement can arrive at an automated or
unautomated industry. When an innovation arrives at an automated industry, the indus-
try becomes unautomated and once again uses labor as the factor input. Therefore, the
share of automated industries, which is also the degree of capital intensity in the aggregate
production function, is endogenously determined by automation and innovation.
In this growth-theoretic framework, we obtain the following results. An increase in R&D
subsidy leads to a higher level of innovation and a higher rate of economic growth. However,
the increase in skilled labor for innovation crowds out skilled labor for automation and leads
to a lower share of automated industries as well as a lower degree of capital intensity in
the aggregate production function. This e¤ect is absent in previous studies with exogenous
capital intensity in production. Capital intensity a¤ects output and welfare because it deter-
mines the returns to scale of capital, which is a reproducible factor that can be accumulated.
An increase in automation subsidy has a negative e¤ect on innovation and economic growth
but a positive e¤ect on the share of automated industries and capital intensity in production.
We also calibrate the model to aggregate US data and obtain the following quantitative
results. Increasing R&D subsidy increases the welfare of high-skill workers but decreases
the welfare of low-skill workers and capital owners. Intuitively, high-skill workers engage in
innovative activities and benet from R&D subsidies, which however hurt low-skill workers
and capital owners due to the tax burden from increasing subsidies and the lower capital
share of income.
Furthermore, increasing automation subsidy increases the welfare of high-skill workers
and also capital owners but decreases the welfare of low-skill workers. Intuitively, high-skill
workers also engage in automation and benet from the subsidies, whereas capital owners
benet from the higher capital share of income. However, low-skill workers are worse o¤ due
to the tax burden from increasing subsidies and the lower labor share of income. Therefore,
whether the government should subsidize automation depends on how it evaluates the welfare
gains and losses of di¤erent agents in the economy. Simulating transition dynamics, we nd
that increasing the automation subsidy rate by 5 percentage points leads to a welfare gain
1See for example Agrawal et al. (2018) for a comprehensive discussion on articial intelligence, which is
the latest form of automation.
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equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 3.14% for capital owners and 2.35%
for high-skill workers as well as a welfare loss of 1.47% for low-skill workers.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. Romer (1990)
develops the seminal R&D-based growth model in which innovation is driven by the inven-
tion of new products. Then, Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model in which inno-
vation is driven by the development of higher-quality products. Many subsequent studies in
this literature use variants of the R&D-based growth model to explore the e¤ects of R&D
subsidies; see for example, Peretto (1998), Segerstrom (2000), Zeng and Zhang (2007), Im-
pullitti (2010), Chu et al. (2016) and Chu and Cozzi (2018). These studies do not feature
automation, and hence, the degree of capital intensity in the aggregate production function
is exogenous or simply zero.
This study also relates to the literature on automation and innovation; see Aghion et
al. (2017) for a comprehensive discussion of this literature. An early study by Zeira (1998)
develops a growth model with capital-labor substitution, which forms the basis of automation
in subsequent studies. Zeira (2006) contributes to the literature by introducing endogenous
invention of technologies into Zeira (1998). Peretto and Seater (2013) propose a growth model
with factor-eliminating technical change in which R&D serves to increase capital intensity
in the production process. Our study relates to Peretto and Seater (2013) by considering
both factor-eliminating technical change (i.e., automation) and factor-augmenting technical
change (i.e., innovation) and exploring their relative importance on growth and welfare.
Recent studies by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Hemous and Olson (2018) generalize
the model in Zeira (1998) and introduce directed technological change between automation
and variety expansion in order to explore the e¤ects of automation on the labor market
and income inequality.2 Our study complements these interesting studies by embedding
endogenous automation into the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model.3 While Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2018) assume in their variety-expanding model that when a new unautomated
product arrives, a previous automated product becomes obsolete, our Schumpeterian model
features an endogenous cycle of innovation and automation on a xed variety of products.
Empirical studies have also examined the e¤ects of automation. For example, Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2017) nd that automation has a negative e¤ect on employment and wages.
Arntz et al. (2017) also nd that automation has a negative e¤ect on the number of jobs.
Dauth et al. (2017) nd that automation has no e¤ect on job losses but a negative e¤ect on
the labor income share. Our theoretical model yields consistent predictions that subsidizing
automation would lead to a negative e¤ect on the wage income of production workers, the
labor share of income and the number of industries that hire workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
compares the e¤ects of the two subsidies. The nal section concludes.
2See also Prettner and Strulik (2017) for a variety-expanding model with automation and education.
3See also Aghion et al. (2017) who develop a Schumpeterian model with exogenous automation.
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2 A Schumpeterian growth model with automation
We introduce automation in the form of capital-labor substitution as in Zeira (1998) into
a canonical Schumpeterian growth model. We consider a cycle of automation and innova-
tion. An unautomated industry that currently uses labor as the factor input can become
automated and then use capital as the factor input. Innovation in the form of a quality
improvement can arrive at an automated or unautomated industry. When an innovation
arrives at an automated industry, the industry becomes unautomated and once again uses
labor as the factor input until the next automation arrives.4 We will derive the equilibrium
condition that supports this cycle of automation and innovation.
2.1 Agents
There are three types of agents in the model. Their lifetime utility functions are given by
U j =
Z 1
0
e t ln cjtdt, (1)
where j 2 fk; l; hg. ckt is the consumption of a representative capital owner. clt is the
consumption of a representative low-skill worker, who engages in the production of goods.
cht is the consumption of a representative high-skill worker, who takes on the roles of a
scientist in innovation and automation. For simplicity, we assume that they all have the
same discount rate  > 0.5
Only the capital owner accumulates (tangible and intangible) capital. He/she maximizes
utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
_at + _kt = rtat + (Rt   )kt   ckt . (2)
at is the real value of assets (i.e., the share of monopolistic rms), and rt is the real interest
rate. kt is physical capital, and Rt    is the real rental price net of capital depreciation.
From standard dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is
_ckt
ckt
= rt   . (3)
Also, the no-arbitrage condition rt = Rt    holds.
The representative low-skill worker supplies l units of low-skill labor. The representative
high-skill worker supplies one unit of high-skill labor, which can be allocated between inno-
vation and automation. wl;t is the real wage rate of low-skill labor in production, whereas
wh;t is the real wage rate of high-skill labor in automation and innovation. Workers simply
consume their after-tax wage income such that clt = (1   t)wl;tl and cht = (1   t)wh;t, where
 t is the rate of labor-income tax (or transfer).6
4Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) provide empirical evidence that "humans have a comparative advantage
in new and more complex tasks" and make a similar assumption that all new inventions are rst produced
by labor until they are automated.
5In our model, only the capital owners discount rate a¤ects the equilibrium allocations.
6We assume that taxes are levied on workers instead of capital owners for two reasons. First, labor
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2.2 Final good
Competitive rms produce nal good yt using the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator over
a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods:
yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnxt(i)di

. (4)
xt(i) denotes intermediate good i 2 [0; 1],7 and the conditional demand function for xt(i) is
xt(i) =
yt
pt(i)
, (5)
where pt(i) is the price of xt(i).
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries, which are also indexed by i 2 [0; 1], producing
di¤erentiated intermediate goods. If an industry is not automated, then the production
process uses low-skill labor and the production function is
xt(i) = z
nt(i)lt(i), (6)
where the parameter z > 1 is the step size of each quality improvement, nt(i) is the number
of quality improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t, and lt(i) is the amount
of low-skill labor employed in industry i. Given the productivity level znt(i), the marginal
cost function of the leader in an unautomated industry i is wl;t=znt(i).
The monopolistic price pt(i) involves a markup over the marginal cost wl;t=znt(i). Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) assume that the markup is equal
to the quality step size z, due to limit pricing between current and previous quality leaders.
Here we follow Howitt (1999) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to consider an alter-
native scenario in which new quality leaders do not engage in limit pricing with previous
quality leaders because after the implementation of the newest innovations, previous quality
leaders exit the market and need to pay a cost before reentering. Given the Cobb-Douglas
aggregator in (4), the unconstrained monopolistic price would be innite. We follow Evans
et al. (2003) to consider price regulation as a policy constraint imposed by the government
under which the regulated markup ratio cannot be greater than  > 1 such that8
pt(i)   wl;t
znt(i)
. (7)
income tends to be more heavily taxed than capital income. According to the classical Chemley-Judd result,
the optimal capital tax rate is zero. In an R&D-based growth model, Chen et al. (2019) nd that the
optimal tax rate on labor income is much higher than that on capital income. Guerreiro et al. (2019) nd
that income from automation should also be taxed. Second, although our analysis of increasing subsidies is
biased against workers, we still nd positive welfare e¤ects on high-skill workers.
7We follow Zeira (1998) to interpret xt(i) as intermediate goods. Alternatively, one could follow Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2018) to interpret xt(i) as tasks.
8This additional markup parameter enables us to perform a more realistic quantitative analysis.
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To maximize prot, the industry leader chooses pt(i) = wl;t=znt(i). In this case, the wage
payment in an unautomated industry is
wl;tlt(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt, (8)
and the amount of monopolistic prot in an unautomated industry is
lt(i) = pt(i)xt(i)  wl;tlt(i) =
  1

yt. (9)
If an industry is automated, then we follow Zeira (1998) to assume that the production
process uses capital. The production function is9
xt(i) =
A
Zt
znt(i)kt(i), (10)
where A > 0 is a parameter that captures an exogenous productivity di¤erence between
automated and unautomated industries. Zt denotes aggregate technology capturing an ero-
sion e¤ect of new technologies that reduce the adaptability of existing physical capital.10
Intuitively, new technologies may not be fully compatible with existing capital, and hence,
they reduce the productivity of capital.11
Given the productivity level znt(i), the marginal cost function of the leader in an auto-
mated industry i is ZtRt=[Aznt(i)]. The monopolistic price pt(i) also involves a markup 
over the marginal cost ZtRt=[Aznt(i)]. Once again, we consider price regulation as a policy
constraint under which
pt(i)   ZtRt
Aznt(i)
. (11)
To maximize prot, the industry leader chooses pt(i) = ZtRt=[Aznt(i)]. In this case, the
capital rental payment in an automated industry is
Rtkt(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt, (12)
and the amount of monopolistic prot in an automated industry is
kt (i) = pt(i)xt(i) Rtkt(i) =
  1

yt. (13)
9If we consider a more general specication xt(i) = Aznt(i)kt(i)=Z

t where  2 [0; 1), then automation
subsidy would have an additional positive e¤ect on economic growth and give rise to an overall inverted-U
e¤ect on growth; see an earlier version of this study in Chu et al. (2018). However, the equilibrium condition
for the automation-innovaton cycle in Section 2.4 would not hold for  2 [0; 1).
10As a result of this erosion e¤ect of technology, the aggregate production function will feature labor-
augmenting technical progress; see (23).
11This specication mirrors Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), who assume that technologies only improve
labor productivity.
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2.4 Automation-innovation cycle
In this section, we derive the equilibrium condition that supports a cycle of automation
and innovation. An unautomated industry that currently uses labor as the factor input can
become automated and then use capital as the factor input. In order for automation to
yield a lower marginal cost of production than an existing innovation, we need the following
condition to hold: ZtRt=A < wl;t. Then, when an innovation arrives at an automated
industry, the industry becomes unautomated and once again uses labor as the factor input
until the next automation arrives.12 In order for the next innovation to yield a lower marginal
cost of production than automation, we need the following condition to hold: wl;t=z <
ZtRt=A. Combining these two conditions yields wl;t=z < ZtRt=A < wl;t. In Lemma 1, we
derive the steady-state equilibrium expression for this condition, in which gy  _yt=yt is the
steady-state growth rate of output.13
Lemma 1 The steady-state equilibrium condition for the automation-innovation cycle is
1
z
<
h
A
(gy + + )
i 1
1 
< 1.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
2.5 R&D and automation
Equations (9) and (13) show that lt(i) = 
l
t and 
k
t (i) = 
k
t for each type of industries.
Therefore, the value of inventions is also the same within each type of industries such that
vlt(i) = v
l
t and v
k
t (i) = v
k
t .
14 The no-arbitrage condition that determines the value vlt of an
unautomated invention is
rt =
lt + _v
l
t   (t + t)vlt
vlt
, (14)
which states that the rate of return on vlt is equal to the interest rate. The return on v
l
t is
the sum of monopolistic prot lt, capital gain _v
l
t and expected capital loss (t+t)v
l
t, where
t is the arrival rate of automation and t is the arrival rate of innovation.15
12A simple example would be robotic chefs. When a new dish is developed, it is usually cooked by a
human chef before it can be automated and cooked by a robot. Nonetheless, our approach is quite stylized
by assuming that a task becomes unautomated immediately after one innovation. In reality, an automated
process may become obsolete only after several rounds of innovation. Therefore, our automation-innovation
cycle should only be viewed as a stylized representation of the reality.
13See (34) for the equilibrium expression of gy.
14We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
15When the next innovation occurs, the previous technology becomes obsolete. See Cozzi (2007) for a
discussion on the Arrow replacement e¤ect.
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Similarly, the no-arbitrage condition that determines the value vkt of an automation is
rt =
kt + _v
k
t   tvkt
vkt
, (15)
which states that the rate of return on vkt is also equal to the interest rate. The return on
vkt is the sum of monopolistic prot 
k
t , capital gain _v
k
t and expected capital loss tv
k
t , where
t is the arrival rate of innovation. The condition in Lemma 1 ensures that the previous
automation becomes obsolete when the next innovation arrives.
Competitive entrepreneurs recruit high-skill labor to perform innovation across all indus-
tries. The arrival rate of innovation in industry i is given by
t(i) = 'thr;t(i), (16)
where 't  'h 1r;t . The aggregate arrival rate of innovation is t = 'hr;t, where hr;t denotes
aggregate R&D labor. Here the parameter  2 (0; 1) captures an intratemporal duplication
externality as in Jones and Williams (2000) and determines the degree of decreasing returns
to scale in R&D at the aggregate level.16 In a symmetric equilibrium, the free-entry condition
of R&D becomes
tv
l
t = (1  s)wh;thr;t , 'vlt = (1  s)wh;th1 r;t , (17)
where s < 1 is the R&D subsidy rate.17
There are also competitive entrepreneurs who recruit high-skill labor to perform automa-
tion in currently unautomated industries. The arrival rate of automation in such industry i
is given by
t(i) = tha;t(i), (18)
where t  (1   t)h 1a;t . Once again,  2 (0; 1) captures the intratemporal duplication
externality and determines the degree of decreasing returns to scale in automation at the
aggregate level.18 The endogenous variable t 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of industries that
are automated at time t. In other words, 1   t captures the following e¤ect: a larger
mass of currently unautomated industries that can be automated makes automation easier
to complete.19 The aggregate arrival rate of automation is t = ha;t, where ha;t denotes
aggregate automation labor and we have used the condition that ha;t(i) = ha;t=(1   t). In
a symmetric equilibrium, the free-entry condition of automation becomes
tv
k
t = (1  )wh;tha;t=(1  t), (1  t)vkt = (1  )wh;th1 a;t , (19)
where  < 1 is the automation subsidy rate.20
16Given the presence of multiple R&D activities, this decreasing returns to scale helps to ensure equilibrium
stability; see Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) for a discussion on how constant returns to scale in multiple
R&D activities can lead to equilibrium instability and perverse comparative statics.
17If s < 0, then it acts as a tax on R&D.
18For simplicity, we assume the same  for automation and innovation.
19Otherwise, if t ! 1, then ha;t(i) = ha;t=(1 t) would become unbounded and have an innite probabil-
ity of automating an industry. Recall that automation is only directed to currently unautomated industries,
which have a mass of 1  t.
20If  < 0, then it acts as a tax on automation.
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2.6 Government
The government collects tax revenue to nance the subsidies on R&D and automation. The
balanced-budget condition is
 t(wl;tl + wh;t) = swh;thr;t + wh;tha;t. (20)
2.7 Aggregate economy
Aggregate technology Zt is dened as21
Zt  exp
Z 1
0
nt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
!d! ln z

, (21)
where
R 1
0
nt(i)di  nt is the aggregate number of innovations that have occurred in the
economy and the last equality in (21) uses the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log
of Zt in (21) with respect to time yields the growth rate of technology given by
gz;t 
_Zt
Zt
= t ln z. (22)
Substituting (6) and (10) into (4) yields the following familiar Cobb-Douglas aggregate pro-
duction function:22
yt =

Akt
t
t  Ztl
1  t
1 t
, (23)
where the share t of automated industries also determines the degree of capital intensity in
the aggregate production function. The evolution of t is determined by
_t = t(1  t)  tt, (24)
where t = ha;t and t = 'h

r;t are respectively the arrival rates of automation and innova-
tion. Using (2), one can derive the familiar law of motion for capital as follows:23
_kt = yt   ct   kt, (25)
where ct  ckt + clt + cht . From (8) and (12), the capital and labor shares of income are
Rtkt =
t

yt, (26)
wl;tl =
1  t

yt. (27)
21Recall that automation does not improve quality but only allows for capital-labor substitution.
22Recall that kt(i) = kt=t and lt(i) = l=(1  t).
23Derivations are available upon request.
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2.8 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; kt; ckt ; clt; cht ; yt; xt(i); lt(i); kt(i); hr;t(i); ha;t(i)g
and a time path of prices frt; Rt; wl;t; wh;t; pt(i); vlt(i); vkt (i)g such that the following conditions
hold in each instance:
 agents maximize utility taking frt; Rt; wl;t; wh;tg as given;
 competitive nal-good rms produce fytg to maximize prot taking fpt(i)g as given;
 each monopolistic intermediate-good rm i produces fxt(i)g and chooses flt(i); kt(i); pt(i)g
to maximize prot taking fwl;t; Rtg as given;
 competitive entrepreneurs choose fhr;t(i); ha;t(i)g to maximize expected prot taking
fwh;t; vlt(i); vkt (i)g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for capital holds such that R t
0
kt(i)di = kt;
 the market-clearing condition for low-skill labor holds such that R 1
t
lt(i)di = l;
 the market-clearing condition for high-skill labor holds such that R 1
0
hr;t(i)di+
R 1
t
ha;t(i)di =
1;
 the market-clearing condition for nal good holds such that yt = _kt + kt + ckt + clt + cht ;
 the value of inventions is equal to the value of the households assets such that R t
0
vkt (i)di+R 1
t
vlt(i)di = at; and
 the government balances the scal budget.
3 Growth and welfare e¤ects of R&D and automation
From (9) and (13), the amount of monopolistic prots in both automated and unautomated
industries is
lt = 
k
t =
  1

yt. (28)
The balanced-growth values of an innovation and an automation are respectively24
vlt =
lt
+  + 
=
lt
+ ha + 'h

r
, (29)
vkt =
kt
+ 
=
kt
+ 'hr
. (30)
24It is useful to note that r   g = , where g is the growth rate of lt and kt and equal to the growth
rate of output and consumption.
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Substituting (29) and (30) into the free-entry conditions in (17) and (19) yields
'(1  )h1 a
(1  )(1  s)h1 r
=
+ ha + 'h

r
+ 'hr
,
which can be reexpressed as
1  
1  s

'

+

1  hr
hr

=

hr
1  hr
1 
+

hr
1  hr
1 2

'+ =hr
. (31)
Equation (31) determines the steady-state equilibrium value of R&D labor hr. If we assume
  1=2,25 then the right-hand side of (31) is increasing in hr, whereas the left-hand side is
always decreasing in hr. Therefore, there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium value of
R&D labor hr from (31) and automation labor ha = 1 hr. R&D labor hr(s; ) is increasing
in R&D subsidy s but decreasing in automation subsidy , whereas automation labor ha(s; )
is increasing in automation subsidy  but decreasing in R&D subsidy s.
From (24), the steady-state share of automated industries is
(s
 
; 
+
) =

 + 
=
ha
ha + 'h

r
, (32)
which is increasing in automation subsidy  but decreasing in R&D subsidy s. The steady-
state equilibrium growth rate of technology is
gz(s
+
; 
 
) =  ln z = 'hr ln z, (33)
where hr(s; ) is determined in (31) and is increasing in R&D subsidy s but decreasing in
automation subsidy . Given that yt and kt grow at the same rate on the balanced growth
path, the aggregate production function in (23) implies that the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate of output yt is
gy(s
+
; 
 
) = gz =  ln z = 'h

r ln z, (34)
where hr(s; ) is determined in (31) and is increasing in R&D subsidy s but decreasing in
automation subsidy . Proposition 1 summarizes these results
Proposition 1 An increase in the R&D subsidy rate s has a positive e¤ect on the technology
growth rate gz, a negative e¤ect on the share  of automated industries and a positive e¤ect
on the output growth rate gy. An increase in the automation subsidy rate  has a negative
e¤ect on the technology growth rate gz, a positive e¤ect on the share  of automated industries
and a negative e¤ect on the output growth rate gy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
25In the appendix, we derive a weaker parameter condition.
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We now examine the e¤ects of R&D/automation subsidies on the welfare of capital
owners, high-skill workers and low-skill workers.26 Given that the balanced growth level of
consumption is cjt = c
j
0 exp(g
j
ct), the steady-state level of welfare U
j can be expressed as
U j =
R1
0
e t(ln c
j
0 + g
j
ct)dt = (ln c
j
0)=+ g
j
c=
2, which in turn can be re-expressed as
U j = ln cj0 +
gjc

(35)
for j 2 fk; l; hg.
From clt = (1  )wl;tl, the steady-state welfare of low-skill workers is given by
U l = ln(1  ) + lnwl;0l + gy

= ln(1  ) + ln

1  

y0

+
gy

, (36)
where the second equality uses (27). U l depends on the after-tax wage income of production
labor. On the balanced growth path, the wage rate wl;t grows at the same rate as output
yt, which in turn determines the growth rate of low-skill workersconsumption. Therefore,
R&D/automation subsidies a¤ect the welfare of low-skill workers through the tax rate  , the
wage income of production labor and the growth rate of output.
From cht = (1  )wh;t, the steady-state welfare of high-skill workers is given by
Uh = ln(1  ) + lnwh;0 + gy

, (37)
where the wage income of high-skill workers can be expressed as
wh;0 =
'=h1 r
1  s
l0
+ ha + 'h

r
=
(1  )=h1 a
1  
k0
+ 'hr
, (38)
which uses (17), (19), (29) and (30). Therefore, R&D/automation subsidies a¤ect the welfare
of high-skill workers through the tax rate  , the wage income of research/automation labor
and the growth rate of output.
The welfare of capital owners can be expressed as
Uk = ln ck0 +
gy

, (39)
where the initial level of their consumption is given by
ck0 = (a0 + k0), (40)
which is obtained by imposing balanced growth on (2). Therefore, R&D/automation subsi-
dies a¤ect the welfare of capital owners through the value of intangible/tangible capital and
the growth rate of output.
26For the welfare e¤ects on a representative household, see an earlier version of this study in Chu et al.
(2018), in which we consider the case of  = 0 for xt(i) = Aznt(i)kt(i)=Z

t in (10). However, the overall
welfare implication on the representative household is similar to the case of  = 1 in the current study.
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3.1 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to aggregate US data in order to perform a quantitative
analysis on the growth and welfare e¤ects of the two subsidies. The model features the
following set of parameters f; ; ; z; '; ; ; s; ; Ag.27 We choose a conventional value of
0.05 for the discount rate . As for the capital depreciation rate , we calibrate its value
using an investment-capital ratio of 0.0765 in the US. We use the estimate in Laitner and
Stolyarov (2004) to consider a value of 1.10 for the markup ratio . We calibrate the quality-
step size z using a long-run technology growth rate of 0.0125 in the US. We calibrate the R&D
productivity parameter ' using an innovation arrival rate of one-third as in Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012). We calibrate the automation productivity parameter  using a labor-income
share of 0.60 in the US. As for the intratemporal externality parameter , we follow Jones and
Williams (2000) to set  to 0.5. Given that the US currently does not apply di¤erent rates
of subsidies to innovation and automation, we consider a natural benchmark of symmetric
subsidies s = .28 Then, we follow Impullitti (2010) to set the rate of subsidies in the US to
0.188. Finally, we pick a value of A that satises the condition for the automation-innovation
cycle in Lemma 1 for the range of fs; g that we consider. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated
parameter values.
Table 1: Calibration
   z '   s  A
0.050 0.064 1.100 1.039 0.403 0.296 0.500 0.188 0.188 0.141
In the rest of this section, we simulate the separate e¤ects of R&D subsidy s and au-
tomation subsidy  on the technology growth rate gz, the share  of automated industries,
the output growth rate gy and the steady-state welfare U j for the three types of agents.29
Figure 1 simulates the e¤ects of R&D subsidy s. Figure 1a shows that R&D subsidy s has a
positive e¤ect on the technology growth rate. For example, increasing R&D subsidy s from
0.188 to 0.238 raises the technology growth rate from 0.0125 to 0.0127. Figure 1b shows
that R&D subsidy s has a negative e¤ect on the share of automated industries. Increasing
s from 0.188 to 0.238 reduces  from 0.340 to 0.326. Figure 1c shows that R&D subsidy s
has a positive e¤ect on the growth rate of output. Increasing s from 0.188 to 0.238 raises
the growth rate of output from 0.0125 to 0.0127. Figure 1d-1f shows that R&D subsidy
s increases the welfare of high-skill workers but decreases the welfare of low-skill workers
and capital owners. Increasing s from 0.188 to 0.238 leads to a welfare gain equivalent to a
permanent increase in consumption of about 2% for high-skill workers as well as a welfare
loss of 6% for capital owners and a welfare loss of 0.2% for low-skill workers.30 Intuitively,
high-skill workers engage in R&D and benet from the subsidies, whereas low-skill workers
are hurt by the higher tax burden despite the higher share of production wage income and
27Our calibration does not require us to assign a value to low-skill production labor l. Although the welfare
function in (36) features the level of low-skill production labor l, it only a¤ects the level of social welfare but
not the change in welfare.
28In our simulation, we will change the individual values of s and  separately.
29We focus on the steady state in this section and consider transition dynamics in the next section.
30The welfare changes are expressed in the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
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capital owners are worse o¤ due to the lower capital share of income.31
Figure 1a: E¤ect of s on gz Figure 1b: E¤ect of s on 
Figure 1c: E¤ect of s on gy Figure 1d: E¤ect of s on steady-state Uk
31If we were to assume that taxes are levied on high-skill workers but not low-skill workers, then R&D
subsidies would hurt high-skill workers due to the higher tax burden and benet low-skill workers due to the
higher share of production wage income.
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Figure 1e: E¤ect of s on steady-state Uh Figure 1f: E¤ect of s on steady-state U l
Figure 2 simulates the e¤ects of automation subsidy . Figure 2a shows that automation
subsidy  has a negative e¤ect on the technology growth rate. For example, increasing
automation subsidy  from 0.188 to 0.238 reduces the technology growth rate from 0.0125
to 0.0122. Figure 2b shows that automation subsidy  has a positive e¤ect on the share of
automated industries. Increasing  from 0.188 to 0.238 raises  from 0.340 to 0.354. Figure
2c shows that automation subsidy  has a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of output.
Increasing  from 0.188 to 0.238 reduces the growth rate of output from 0.0125 to 0.0122.
Figure 2d-2f shows that automation subsidy  increases the welfare of high-skill workers and
capital owners but decreases the welfare of low-skill workers. Increasing  from 0.188 to
0.238 leads to a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of about 6%
for capital owners and 3% for high-skill workers as well as a welfare loss of 0.7% for low-skill
workers. Intuitively, high-skill workers engage in automation and benet from the subsidies,
whereas capital owners benet from the higher capital share of income; however, low-skill
workers are hurt by the higher tax burden and the lower share of production wage income.32
Figure 2a: E¤ect of  on gz Figure 2b: E¤ect of  on 
32These results would be qualitatively the same if we were to assume that taxes are levied on high-skill
workers but not low-skill workers.
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Figure 2c: E¤ect of  on gy Figure 2d: E¤ect of  on steady-state Uk
Figure 2e: E¤ect of  on steady-state Uh Figure 2f: E¤ect of  on steady-state U l
3.2 Transition dynamics
We use the relaxation algorithm in Trimborn et al. (2008) to simulate the transitional
dynamic e¤ects of raising automation subsidy  from 0.188 to 0.238.33 Figure 3a shows
that an increase in automation subsidy leads to a lower technology growth rate gz;t. The
initial drop in gz;t is larger than the decrease in the long run. As shown in Figure 3b, capital
intensity t increases towards a higher level that requires a large amount of automation labor
ha;t, which crowds out R&D labor hr;t. Figure 3c shows that despite the fall in technology
growth gz;t, the output growth rate gy;t increases after one year before gradually falling
towards the new steady state, which is below the initial steady state. The drastic initial
increase in output growth gy;t is due to the high initial growth in capital intensity t.
Figure 3d and 3e show that the (log) level of consumption of capital owners and high-skill
workers gradually converges to a higher balanced growth path (BGP), which however has a
33See Appendix B for a summary of the dynamic equations. The results of raising R&D subsidy s are
available upon request.
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lower growth rate than the initial BGP. Given that the transitional path of consumption is
below the new BGP, the transitional welfare gains are likely to be smaller than the steady-
state welfare gains computed in the previous section. Figure 3f shows that the level of
consumption of low-skill workers falls below the new BGP and gradually converges to it from
below. Therefore, the transitional welfare loss on low-skill workers is likely to be larger than
the steady-state welfare loss in the previous section. Comparing the new transitional path
of consumption and its initial BGP, we compute a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent
increase in consumption of 3.14% for capital owners and 2.35% for high-skill workers as well
as a welfare loss of 1.47% for low-skill workers. Finally, Figure 4a and 4b show that the
transitional welfare e¤ects of automation subsidy  on capital owners and high-skill workers
are about one-half to two-thirds of the steady-state welfare e¤ects of  in Figure 2d-2e,
whereas Figure 4c shows that the transitional welfare e¤ects of automation subsidy  on
low-skill workers are about twice the steady-state welfare e¤ects in Figure 2f. Therefore,
focusing on the steady state may overstate the welfare e¤ects on some groups but understate
the welfare e¤ects on others.
Figure 3a: Dynamic e¤ect of  on gz Figure 3b: Dynamic e¤ect of  on 
Figure 3c: Dynamic e¤ect of  on gy Figure 3d: Dynamic e¤ect of  on ck
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Figure 3e: Dynamic e¤ect of  on ch Figure 3f: Dynamic e¤ect of  on cl
Figure 4a: E¤ect of  on transitional Uk Figure 4b: E¤ect of  on transitional Uh
Figure 4c: E¤ect of  on transitional U l
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a simple Schumpeterian growth model with automation.
Our model features innovation in the form of quality improvement and also automation in
the form of capital-labor substitution. Innovation gives rise to technological progress whereas
automation increases the returns to scale of capital in production. R&D subsidy increases
innovation but crowds out automation, whereas automation subsidy has the opposite ef-
fects. As a result, increasing R&D subsidy has a positive e¤ect on innovation and growth
but a negative e¤ect on capital intensity in aggregate production. In contrast, increasing
automation subsidy has a negative e¤ect on innovation and growth but a positive e¤ect on
capital intensity in aggregate production. Our quantitative analysis shows that increasing
R&D subsidy improves the welfare of high-skill workers but hurts the welfare of low-skill
workers and capital owners, whereas increasing automation subsidy improves the welfare of
high-skill workers and capital owners but hurts the welfare of low-skill workers. In other
words, subsidizing automation has di¤erent welfare implications on di¤erent groups in the
economy. Therefore, whether the government should subsidize innovation or automation
depends on how it evaluates the welfare gains and losses of di¤erent agents in the economy.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the no-arbitrage condition r = R    and the Euler equation
r = gy + , we can reexpress the equilibrium condition that supports a cycle of automation
and innovation as
1
z
<
Z
A

gy + + 
wl

< 1. (A1)
We substitute production labor income wll = (1  ) y= and the aggregate production
function y = (Ak=) [Zl= (1  )]1  into (A1) to derive
1
z
<

1
A
 1
1 

y
k
 
1 
[ (gy + + )] < 1. (A2)
From capital income Rk = y=, the steady-state capital-output ratio is given by
k
y
=

R
=

 (r + )
=

 (gy + + )
. (A3)
Substituting (A3) into (A2) yields the steady-state equilibrium condition for the automation-
innovation cycle.
Proof of Proposition 1. We rst establish the following su¢ cient parameter condition
for the uniqueness of the equilibrium:
 <
+ 
2+ 
2 (1=2; 1). (A4)
The left-hand side (LHS) of (31) is decreasing in hr, whereas the derivative of the right-hand
side (RHS) of (31) is given by
d
dhr
RHS =
1
(1  hr)2

1  hr
hr
 "
 (1  hr)1+
('hr + )
2 + (1  )  (2  1)
 (1  hr)
'hr + 
#
| {z }

. (A5)
Equation (A5) shows that when  < 1=2, RHS of (31) is monotonically increasing in hr. As
for  > 1=2, we consider the following lower bound of :
 > (1  )  (2  1)  (1  hr)

'hr + 
> (1  )   (2  1)

. (A6)
Equation (A6) shows that  < (+ ) = (2+ ) in (A1) is a su¢ cient condition for  > 0;
in this case, RHS of (31) is monotonically increasing in hr. Therefore, we have established
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that the equilibrium hr is uniquely determined by (31) as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Equilibrium uniqueness
LHS of (31) being increasing in s (decreasing in ) implies that hr is monotonically increasing
from 0 to 1 as s < 1 increases on its domain (decreasing from 1 to 0 as  < 1 increases on
its domain).34 For the e¤ects of fs; g on , we use (32) to derive that  is increasing in 
but decreasing in s. As for the e¤ects of fs; g on fgz; gyg, we use (33) and (34) to establish
that both gz and gy are increasing in s but decreasing in .
34Recall that s and  can be negative, in which case they act as taxes.
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Appendix B: Dynamic equations
This appendix describes the dynamics of the economy. Using (23) and (26), we obtain
rt = Rt    = tyt
kt
   = A
tZ1 tt


t
1  t
l
kt
1 t
  . (B1)
Based on clt = (1   t)wl;tl and cht = (1   t)wh;t, we make use of (17), (19), (20) and (27) to
obtain
clt
kt
+
cht
kt
=
(1   t) (wl;tl + wh;t)
kt
=

1  t


yt
kt
+
tv
l
t
kt
+
t (1  t) vkt
kt
. (B2)
Substituting (B1) into (3) yields the growth rate of consumption as
_ckt
ckt
=
AtZ1 tt


t
1  t
l
kt
1 t
     . (B3)
Using (9), (13), (23), (B1), t = 'hr;t and t = h

a;t, we reexpress (14) and (15) as
_vlt
vlt
=
AtZ1 tt


t
1  t
l
kt
1 t
   + ha;t + 'hr;t  
At(  1)=
(t)t (1  t)1 t
[kt=(lZt)]
t
vlt=(lZt)
, (B4)
_vkt
vkt
=
AtZ1 tt


t
1  t
l
kt
1 t
   + 'hr;t  
At(  1)=
(t)t (1  t)1 t
[kt=(lZt)]
t
vkt =(lZt)
. (B5)
From (23), (25) and (B2), we derive the growth rate of capital kt as
_kt
kt
=
[1  (1  t) =]AtZ1 tt
(t)t (1  t)1 t

l
kt
1 t
  c
k
t
kt
   'hr;t vltkt    ha;t (1  t)v
k
t
kt
  , (B6)
where we have used t = 'hr;t and t = h

a;t. The dynamics of t and Zt are given by
_t =
 
ha;t

(1  t) 
 
'hr;t

t, (B7)
_Zt
Zt
= 'hr;t ln z. (B8)
Di¤erential equations in (B3)-(B8) describe the autonomous dynamics of fckt ; vlt; vkt ; kt; t; Ztg
along with the following two static conditions:
hr;t =

'(1  )vlt
1=(1 )
 (1  s) (1  t) vkt
1=(1 )
+

'(1  )vlt
1=(1 ) , (B9a)
ha;t =

 (1  s) (1  t) vkt
1=(1 )
 (1  s) (1  t) vkt
1=(1 )
+

'(1  )vlt
1=(1 ) , (B9b)
which are obtained by eliminating wh;t from (17) and (19) to derive
hr;t
ha;t
=

' (1  )
 (1  s) (1  t)
vlt
vkt
1=(1 )
(B10)
and by substituting (B10) into ha;t + hr;t = 1. Finally, one can divide fckt ; vlt; vkt ; ktg by lZt
to dene stationarized variables and also eliminate l from the dynamic system.
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